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WHO HAS THE BETTER RIGHT TO NON-TRIBUTORY GROUND WATERS IN COLORADOLANDOWNER OR APPROPRIATOR?
CLYDE 0. MARTZ
Associate Professor of hai, University of Colorado

I am flattered by the opportunity your chairman has given
me to participate in the program of this highly important and
reputable water section of the Colorado Bar Association. I would
like to think that the invitation was prompted by his belief that
I might have something worthwhile and interesting to say. But
I know it to be a fact that in his desire to save his flock from the
usual bloodshed that accompanies these gatherings, he looked to
me, a representative of the state university, as his one safe choice,
free of factional ties and territorial loyalties, and fair game for
you rapier minded veterans of many a water battle to draw and
quarter in the sport of the morning. His precaution was unnecessary. For while the subject of today's program is a controversial
one, it is unique in the ever controversial water law field in that
the multiple points of view which it raises do not represent territorial differences. His ambush, I have hoped to avoid by stacking
the rostrum with John Clayton of Greeley and Ray Moses of Alamosa, men I will be confident to pit against the deans among you
in any jousts that follow our remarks.
As you all know, in eighty years of water resource development in this state, almost no attention has been given by our courts
and legislature to the nature of private rights to percolating ground
waters that do not flow in any well defined channel and which
are not demonstrably tributory to surface or underground natural
streams. In the early days landowners drilled many wells, principally for domestic uses, without claiming appropriation rights
in the underground aquifers on the basis of their priority of use.
There seemed to be an abundance of water for all their present and
contemplated future uses. It is safe to assume from the absence
of filings, the absenee of adjudications of priorities and the absence of any legislation limiting or apportioning ground water uses
that the majority believed that the common law gave them rights
to such waters incident to the title to their lands.
But in the last fifteen years, as ground water uses have rapidly
increased, have produced overdrafts upon many aquifers with
low annual rates of recharge and have begun to lower water tables
to the injury of existing wells, the lackadaisical unconcern of well
users about the protection of their sources of supply and priorities
of right has undergone quite a change. R.E.A. has brought inexpensive power to rural areas and has made possible large scale
pumping operations for irrigation uses. New lands are being irrigated by ground waters remote from stream sources, and many
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who have stream appropriations are sinking wells on adjoining
lands to get a more dependable supply. Conflicts in interests are
becoming increasingly acute and claims are being openly asserted
to water rights, in some cases on the basis of priority of use, and
in others on the basis of situs of land holdings over ground water
aquifers. Pumpers are swamping the state engineer's office with
filings on purported appropriations.
In response to these claims, the Honorable Paul Littler held
an adjudication in 1948 in the District Court of Mesa County on
waters found by him to be part of an artesian basin not tributory
to any stream. Motions to dismiss, filed on the grounds that the
court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate these waters, were denied,
the judge concluding that the Supreme Court had early held that
common law doctrines whether relating to surface or percolating
ground waters have never been applicable in Colora.do and that
this was true even before the Constitution, and separate and apart
from any legislation. He limited the decisions, however, to artesian waters on the basis that they were similar to the springs
which may be appropriated under the waste, seepage, and spring
water statute. (Discussed 26 Dicta 92.) The case was not appealed. This year the Honorable Henry S. Lindsley, sitting in
Conejos County took the contrary position and ruled in the case of
Thomas v. Brady that in the absence of a contitutional or statutory
dedication of these waters to public use, they must be governed
by the common law reasonable use or correlative rights doctrines.
Concurrently with this action, however, another adjudication was
started in District 3 under the direction of the Honorable Claude
C. Coffin. My colleagues will give you on-the-spot reports of the
circumstances leading to these current proceedings and the points
of view and reactions of the people in the affected areas. I will
try to lay a foundation for their remarks by reviewing the present
status of the law, outlining the several alternatives open to our
court and considering some of the obstacles the alternatives present
to the administration of an effective ground water appropriation
law.
Art. XVI, Sec. 5, of the Colorado Constitution declares that
the water of every natural stream is the property of the public,
rather than the property of riparian landowners, and makes such
waters the subject of appropriations. The Supreme Court, conforming to the appropriation philosophy of the state, has given
the phrase "natural stream" a liberal construction. It has confirmed appropriations under this section to the sublow of surface
streams Buckners Irr. Mill & Imp. Co. v. Farmer's Independent
Ditch Co.,' to underground streams, the channels of which can be
distinctly traced Medano Ditch Co. v. Adams, 2 and to percolating
waters which are sources of supply of surface or underground
131 Colo. 62, 72 P. 49 (1902).
2 29 Colo. 317, "68 P. 431 (1902).
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water courses Safranek v. Limon,' and Dalpez v. Nix.4 But even
a liberal construction will not stretch the phrase "natural stream"
to cover waters which are not tributory to either surface or underground channels. The Constitutional dedication has been supplemented by statute, 5 which subjects to appropriation non-tributory waste, surface and spring waters to the extent such waters
are not needed by the owner of the land where they arise. This
section does not cover percolating ground waters, though it was
suggested in the Mesa County adjudication that wells in artesian
basins were essentially the same as springs and might be brought
under this statute by construction. Even if so construed, however, the statute would not give an appropriator of ground waters
a paramount right to the man who could drill a well on his own
land. Rights to non-tributory ground waters do not therefore stem
from either constitutional or statutory provisions but must rest
upon the common law applicable to this jurisdiction. That much
is clear. But the uncertainties which are evidenced by the conflicting views of our judges arise from an absence of reliable guides
as to which of four possible common law rules-absolute ownership, reasonable use, correlative rights and appropriation-is applicable in Colorado.
The absolute ownership doctrine stems from the English case
of Acton v. Blundell 6 and has general application in England,
the Eastern states, and, at one time, in a sizable number of the
arid western states. It regards the percolating waters as part of
the land in which they are found, and, pursuant to the ad coelum
maxim, gives the surface owner an unqualified right to pump the
water for use on his own land or as a commodity in trade. Injury
to his neighbor, except as it may be caused maliciously, is regarded
as damnum absque injuria. Under this view the water right is a
vested property interest, not dependent upon use and beyond the
power of the legislature to limit or destroy by regulatory conservation measures without just compensation to the user.
Although this doctrine has not positively been eliminated as
a possibility in Colorado since strong and long standing local customs supporting it may still be shown, and if shown, would be
persuasive on our court, it appears to be running such a poor
fourth that it calls for no extensive consideration today. Notwithstanding statements in some of the early cases such as Bruening v. Dorr 7 that percolating water existing in the earth belongs
to the soil, is -apart of the realty and may be used and controlled
to the same extent by the landowner, the court in the recent case
of Safranak v. Limon, supra, has declared: "We have long since
departed from the English common law doctrine of ownership of
3123 Colo. 33'0, 228 P. 2d 975 (1951).
496 Colo. 540, 45 P. 2d 176 (1935).
'COLO.

STAT. ANN.,

C. 90, §§ 20, 21 (1935).

12 Mees & W 324.
23 Colo. 195, 47 P. 290 (1896).
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percolating waters by the surface owner. . . . Whether in such
case [the case of non-tributory waters] 8 we should follow the
California doctrine of reciprocal rights, developed from its law
of riparian rights, or whether we should extend one step further
our Colorado doctrine of first in time, first in right, need not now
be determined.
Reasonable use is likewise an ownership doctrine, but recognizes reasonable limitations upon the landowners' exploitation
rights. It permits him to take all the water he can use for reasonable beneficial uses upon his land, but outlaws, as unreasonable,
diversions to lands outside the source basin. It sets no quantitative limits, however, on individual use and allows pumpers to
exceed the annual rate of recharge with impunity. In those areas
of water scarcity that are committed to an ownership doctrine by
statute or prior decision, this view has been gaining support. For
unlike the absolutist doctrine, it tends to assure beneficial and
non-wasteful use of a limited source of supply. Even under a
statute declaring the proprietor to be the owner of waters percolating through his land, the Oklahoma court, prompted by these
conservation objectives, has forbidden him to waste his waters
and has limited him to reasonable uses upon his own land. Canada
v. City of Shawner.9
Support for this doctrine may be found in Colorado, first,
from the fact that it has a substantial following in states similar
to ours, where common law proprietary rights may have arisen
from long usage, but must now be curtailed to some extent in order
to preserve a dwindling natural resource; second, from the fact
that our court has recognized that other fugacious substances,
namely, oil and gas, are owned in place by overlying landowners;
third, by the approbation given by our legislature in the waste
seepage and spring water statute to a comparable right of the
proprietor of land to recapture non-tributory waters arising
thereon, for, but only for, reasonable uses upon his own land;
and finally, by the fact that the people of the state for some
eighty years have probably assumed that they had some sort of
proprietary interest in the waters that was incident to their
rights in the soil. These customs have played an important part
in the determination of water right, as the birth of the appropriation doctrine itself bears witness. Again in Bristor v. Cheatham, the Arizona court, upon rehearing a decision in which it had
recognized an appropriation doctrine, reversed itself on the grounds
that water users had relied for so long a time upon their ownership rights that it would not be proper to change the rule at this
late date. In the Sefranak v. Livmon case, our court seemed to
ignore the American reasonable use doctrine as a possibility for
Colorado, suggesting that the alternatives for non-tributary ground
Explanation supplied by Author.
'179 Okla. 53, 64 P. 694 (1937).
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waters are correlative rights or appropriation. Its statements
were, however, only dicta and were disregarded by the Honorable
Henry S. Lindsley in the recent Conejos County proceeding, where
he said the reasonable use doctrine should be the rule of that case.
Were this doctrine ultimately to receive the blessings of our
highest court, I foresee serious consequences. In the first place, I
have grave doubts that it could ever be displaced, either by statute
or constitutional amendment, by a priority system or any other
system designed to curb overdrafts from and the ultimate exhaustion of many ground water reservoirs. For the right of each
landowner to present and future beneficial uses of his ground water
supply vested in him at the date of his patent and is neither
limited nor lost by the insignificance or absence of past pumping
operations. That statutory or constitutional limitations upon these
rights would rest on thin ice was indicated by our court in
Strickler v. Colorado Springs, where it was said: "Art. XVI, sec. 5
and 6, (implementing the rule of priority for natural streams) are
not intended to affect and do not affect prior vested rights, but all
owners of such rights are entitled to compensation therefore before the same can be taken or injuriously affected." [states such
as Wyoming which recognizes this rule have been unable to do
more in their ground water codes than to require the filing of
drilling information and the elimination of waste.] Even if an
appropriation law, operating prospectively only, could be superimposed for conservation purposes upon such a proprietary system, we would face the confusion that has been inherent in the
California dual system of water rights, a confusion which we have
successfully avoided to date by strict adherence to the appropriation, and renunciation of riparian principles with respect to other
waters of the state. Finally, under this view it is clear that the
landowner has no property rights to the ground water level. So
long as water is put to reasonable uses upon lands overlying the
aquifer, competing pumpers can mine the source without liability
and ultimately exhaust those aquifers with low annual rates of
recharge. Being merely a modification of the absolutist doctrine,
reasonable use has many of the same shortcomings, and should be
recognized only if the state is already committed to an ownership view and must make the best of it.
The correlative rights doctrine championed only by California
is merely an application of riparian law to ground waters. It regards all landowners who overlie an aquifer as joint tenants and
allows each a reasonable proportion of the annual recharge for
beneficial uses upon his own land. Any operation which lowers
the water table or which transports water beyond the source basin
is unreasonable per se and may be enjoined at the suit of injured
tenants. Accordingly, it places quantitative limits upon the right
a landowner would enjoy under the reasonable use doctrine.
Colorado has consistently rejected riparian law applications
to surface waters and to underground streams. It has avoided thus
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far the difficult administrative problems, which have long plagued
the California court in its attempt under this doctrine to define
the proportionate interests of overlying owners and the prescriptive rights of those who have effected a reduction in the water table.
Superimpose on this system an appropriation doctrine for surplus
waters, as California has done, and you have hopeless confusion.
Only the very hardy, I believe, can read Pasadena v. Alhambra,1adjudicating the rights of overlying owners, claimants of prescriptive rights and appropriators to the waters of the Raymond
Basin in California and still propose this doctrine for Colorado.
Yet the court in Safranek v. Limon suggested this as the only
alternative to appropriation.
A final possibility for our court and one I hope it will elect
is the principle of appropriation. Rights based upon priority of
use can exist and indeed have been held to exist in this and other
states in the absence of any constitutional or statutory dedications.
Idaho has subjected ground waters to appropriation by force of
the common law alone. Hinton v. Little." Utah sampled both reasonable use and correlative rights doctrines till 1935 when the
court swept away all proprietary rights and held the rule of appropriation to have been law from the start.' Precedent exists for
similar action in Colorado. In the case of Coffin v. Left Hand
Ditch Co.,13 our court speaking many years ago of surface streams
but in words which would be equally applicable to ground waters
said:
It is contended that the doctrine of priority was
first recognized and adopted in the Constitution. But we
think the latter doctrine has existed from the date of the
earliest appropriations of water within the boundaries of
the State. The climate is dry and the soil when moistened
by usual rainfall is arid and unproductive. Artificial irrigation for agriculture is an absolute necessity. . . . The
right to water in this country, therefore, by priority of
appropriation, we think it is and always has been the duty
of the national and state governments to protect. Snyder
v. Colorado Gold Dredging Co., 181 Fed. 62; Fort Collins
Milling Co. v. Larimer Irri. Co., 61 Colo. 45, 156 Pac. 140.
The appropriation doctrine for ground waters has a full
measure of rational and judicial support. First, it is the only
common law doctrine that will preserve uniformity in our surface
and ground water administration and apply a basic water policy
throughout the State. In deciding that percolating waters were
appropriable in Utah, the United States Supreme Court in Snake
1033 Cal. 2d 908, 207 P. 2d 17 (1949).
"50 Idaho 371, 296 P. 582 (1931).
"Wrathall v. Johnson, 86 Utah 50, 40 P. 2d 755 (1935).
"6

Colo. 443 (1882).
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Creek Tunnel Co. v. Midway Irr. Co. 14 looked to the policy of the
state as evidenced by its court decisions. The President's Water
Policy Commission in 1950 concluded that percolating waters were
subject to appropriation in Colorado because of the state's traditional appropriation policy. Professor Kirkwood, a well-known
California water authority recently emphasized the importance
of a uniform state water policy by saying that the principle justification for the correlative rights doctrine in California lies in the
fact that it applies the same principal to ground water that the
state's dual water system applies to surface and underground
streams. 15 By the same sound rationale only the appropriation
doctrine is fitted to the needs of a Colorado doctrine state.
Secondly, proprietary rights, even if recognized, are of relatively little value in this state. Colorado has few impervious basins
with respect to which it can be said that the waters contained
therein will never reach a surface or underground channel. And
our court has made it virtually impossible for the landowner to
show the existence of such basins by raising a presumption that all
waters are tributary-a presumption that can only be rebutted
by clear and convincing evidence of dikes and other barriers to
movement. 16 In basins where proprietary rights are asserted today,
it is likely, with the steady increase in our knowledge of ground
water movements that appropriation rights will be asserted in the
future. Thus, only those pumpers who have established priorities
of right by actual use are secure against encroachment by future
appropriators of tributary waters. In the few impervious basins
where proprietary rights might exist, uncontrolled pumping will
eventually exhaust the supply and the proprietors will be left with
naked rights to extinct or at least high production cost aquifers.
Thirdly, appropriation of ground waters has been likened to
the rule applicable to developed waters. Where a man developed a
new source of supply and adds new water to a stream, he is recognized by a long line of cases as the appropriator of the source,
Ironstone Ditch Co. v. Ashenfelter.17 The well driller in an impervious basin also develops a new source of supply. By analogy
he should be allowed to adjudicate the priority of his right and
was so privileged in the Mesa County adjudication of 1948.
Finally, judicial recognition of a common law appropriation
doctrine is absolutely necessary to sustain comprehensive conservation legislation designed to preserve usable water tables and
protect existing investments in water supplies in critical areas.
Antipathy to the priority rule for ground water appears to
rest first upon a fear that such appropriations would be sub"260 U. S. 596, 43 S. Ct. 215.
1 Stan. L. Rev. 9.
'*
Safranek v. Limon, 123 Colo. 330, 228 P. 2d 975; DeHaas v. Benesch, 116
Colo. 344, 181 P. 2d 453.
"757 Colo. 31, 140 P. 177 (1914).
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servient to the paramount rights of appropriators on streams to
which such waters are presumptively tributary. And secondly,
upon a belief that senior ground water appropriators may severely
limit the beneficial uses in a basin by insisting upon the preservation of the natural water table. I believe these fears are groundless.
In the first place, a stream appropriator can restrain the pumping
of tributary ground waters only if he can show positive injury
to his rights from such use, Albia Idaho Land Co. v. Naf Irr. Co.
Generally such injury cannot be shown. The great lag between
percolation water diversions and their effect upon stream flow
is often so great as to postpone that effect until the critical season
for stream appropriators has passed. Moreover, in the principal
basins of the state where waters may fairly be presumed to be
tributary, geologists inform us that the recharge from seepage
is so great that little effect will ever be felt by the stream from
the intra-basin uses. If positive injuiy to a senior stream appropriator can be shown, however, I think we would all agree that his
right be protected.
With regard to the second objection, it is true that the great
majority of states have held the appropriator entitled to the lift
that existed at the time his appropriation was made. In Pima
18
Farms v. Proctor,
for example, the Arizona court preserved for
the senior the level of an underground stream "so that his means
of capture and diversion as originally installed would not be impaired or destroyed for his uses." But the existence of this right
need not restrict the total use from the aquifer, The Utah court
which recognizes appropriation rights to ground waters and in
particular this right to natural lift has reached a sensible compromise in Hanson v. Salt Lake City,19 where it permitted reductions in reservoir levels but required that subsequent appropriators
bear the added expense to the senior of bringing his water to the
surface.
In choosing between the four common law doctrines, our court
has no obligation to recognize that proprietary rights have vested
with the patents to overlying lands, but need only consider the
customs and best interests of the arid regions of the state. The
Supreme Court of the United States said in California-Oregon
Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co. 20 that following the
Desert Land Act of 1877, if not before, all non-navigable waters
then a part of the public domain became publici juris, with the
right in each state to determine for itself to what extent the rule
of appropriation or the common law riparian rule should obtain.
For the future, it said, land should be patented separately from
water. The reasoning of this case was recently extended by the
New Mexico court, in Bliss v. Dority,21 and by a minority of the
"30 Ariz. 96, 245 P. 369 (1926).
" 115 Utah 404, 205 P. 2d 255 (1949).
" 295 U. S. 142, 55 S. Ct. 725.
2'55 N. M. 12, 225 P. 2d 1007 (1950).
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Arizona court in the second Bristor v. Cheatham 21case so as to
implement common law appropriation doctrines and thereby permit subsequent legislation to limit the pumper's rights. In the first
of these cases the defendant was denied a right to take water
from the Roswell basin for use on his overlying land without a
permit from the state engineer. His objection, that the appropriation statute deprived him of property rights in the water incident
to the title of his land, was disregarded, the court saying that he
never had a vested right to the water that could be adversely
affected by the water code. On first hearing of the Bristor v.
Cheatham case, the court followed the New Mexico lead notwithstanding earlier cases such as Howard v. Perrin23 to the effect
that the ownership rule obtained. The court said in part: "If rule
of ownership is adhered to, the legislature is shackled from enacting an underground water code to meet the present emergency."
Upon rehearing the court shifted back to the ownership view because of stare decisis and by its own admission has prevented the
legislature from limiting existing uses so far as is necessary to
halt a rapid decline in critical water tables, which decline has
amounted to 34 feet in Mariposa County since 1945. The priority
rule for ground waters is supported by reason, is prompted by
emergency conditions, and is consistent with the age-old water
policies of the state. To me, it is of critical importance to our water
program that we avoid the pitfall of the second Bristor case. In
place of submitting to claims of ownership made by domestic
users in an age when ground waters were plentiful, I hope our
courts, when adjudication of ground water rights are presented
to them, look to a rule, which they have a free hand to adopt, that
will permit such regulation of ground waters as will be adequate
to protect future supplies.
'75 Ariz. 227, 240 P. 2d 185, 255 P. 2d 173 (1953).
"8 Ariz. 347, 200 U. S. 71.
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